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In this paper we analyze whether the employment/productivity profile of growth as well 
as its sectoral pattern matter for poverty reduction. We also identify some conditions of 
the labor market which are associated with employment intensive growth or specific 
sectoral growth. 
 
We find that, in the short run, while the overall employment intensity of growth does not 
matter for poverty reduction, the sectoral pattern of employment growth and productivity 
growth is important. While employment intensive growth in the secondary sector appears 
to be associated with decreases in poverty, employment intensive growth in agriculture 
increases poverty. Similarly productivity intensive growth in agriculture is associated 
with poverty reduction. 
 
The results suggest that focusing on the aggregate employment elasticity of growth, 
alone, as a way to reduce poverty may lead to misleading policy recommendations and 
more be gained by focusing on secondary sector employment growth and productivity 
intensive growth in agriculture.
                                                 
1 Poverty Reduction Group, World Bank 
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Introduction 
Recent years has seen a growing concern amongst policy makers with ‘jobless’ growth as 
a major obstacle to the poor benefiting from the positive growth performance experienced 
by many countries worldwide. This has been reflected in (i) an increase emphasis on the 
employment elasticity of growth as an indicator of the equity of the growth process and 
(ii) an intense debate on how best to foster employment intensive growth.2 Behind this 
emphasis is the implicit assumption that employment generation plays an important role 
in reducing poverty. This seems intuitive as the poor derive most of their 
income/consumption from work, as employees, self-employed or in subsistence activities. 
Thus the impact of growth on poverty is seen as depending on the extent to which it 
generates employment. But is employment-intensive growth sufficient to ensure poverty 
reduction? Is it even necessary in Low Income Countries (LICs) where unemployment is 
a luxury, most people are employed in low-productivity, low-wage activities and the 
number of ‘working poor’ has increased from 88% of the employed to 95% (if China and 
South Asia are excluded). Would the poverty reduction efforts of policy makers not be 
more fruitfully targeted to improving the quality of available employment—defined in 
terms of the income it generates? This is clearly a very important policy question.  
Another recurrent issue in the policy discussion is whether poverty reduction is more 
effectively achieved by a growth pattern that favors the sectors of the economy in which 
the poor are, so as to enhance employment opportunities—ie, labor intensive growth in 
unskilled sectors—or by one that advances disproportionally the sectors where the poor 
are not, so that more of the poor can be drawn into the higher-earning parts of the 
economy.3 The solution to this puzzle rests on the answer to two sets of questions. The 
first relates to the extent to which the sectoral impact of growth matter for poverty 
reduction. Does it matters more than the overall employment elasticity? And if it does, 
what are the most effective poverty-reducing growth paths and what are the factors that 
prevent some countries from following these paths?    
Despite their clear importance of these questions for the development of successful 
shared growth strategies in LICs, they remain largely unexplored in the current literature 
and this significantly undermines the ability to provide sound evidence-based policy 
advice in this area.  
The main objective of this paper is to deepen the understanding of these issues by (i) 
providing a comprehensive profile of the relative role of employment generation and 
productivity enhancement in explaining poverty reduction across a large sample of 
countries and (ii) presenting empirical findings on the importance of the sectoral pattern 
of growth in explaining the heterogeneity of poverty’s response to growth across a 
number of countries. It also attempts to assess the extent to which the prevailing labor 
                                                 
2 One of the core elements of the global employment agenda “Macroeconomic policies for growth and 
employment” calls for addressing four key questions, one of which is “How can the employment intensity 
of growth be increased”; ILO (2003). 
3 Achieving economic development by moving people out of the poorer sectors and into the richer ones has 
been labeled “intersectoral shifts.” Both the Lewis and the Kuznets models described above are models of 




market conditions and the average skill of the labor force play a role in explaining 
differences in growth patterns. 
The paper contributes to the exiting literature in several ways. First, it provides empirical 
input to the debate on the impact of the sectoral patterns of growth by studying the 
sectoral employment/productivity profile of growth and its impact on poverty. Second, it 
develops a new methodology to estimate the impact of employment intensive growth on 
poverty. Most studies that address the poverty impact of employment intensive growth 
use the total change in employment over the total change in output as a measure for the 
total elasticity of employment, and then regress this variable against changes in poverty. 
As mentioned by Sundaram  and Tendulkar (2002) this methodology has several 
drawbacks. Instead we use Shapely decompositions of growth into changes in several 
components one of which is the share of the labor force that is employed. This paper uses 
the amount of growth in output per worker associated with changes in employment 
(holding all else constant), as a measure of employment intensive growth. As it will be 
discussed, this measure has some advantages over the use of total employment elasticity. 
Finally, we go beyond the study of the link between the profile of growth and poverty 
reduction, and provide some preliminary evidence as to which labor market conditions 
determine the pattern of growth observed. 
 
The paper is structured as follows the next section discusses the methodology and data. 
Section  2 shows that the overall employment intensity of growth has little relevance for 
poverty reduction. Section  3 discusses why this might be so and analyzes the role of the 
sectoral distribution of employment and productivity intensity of growth on poverty 
reduction. The extent to which labor conditions play any role in explaining the pattern of 
growth is explored in section  4. Section  5 concludes. 
 
 
1 Methodology and data 
 
1.1 Measuring the employment intensity of growth  
 
The most common measure of employment intensive growth is the partial elasticity of 
employment with respect to growth EYYE */* ∂∂ , which is obtained by regressing log 
of aggregate employment against the log total GDP, aggregate wages and other controls. 
Because it is a demand elasticity, it assumes a causality from growth to employment 
changes. There are both conceptual and empirical difficulties with respect to this 
measure. Conceptually, it tries to categorize growth as good or bad depending on whether 
it generates employment or not. It is however possible that observed growth is due to 
new entrants into the labor market; conceptually it is unclear whether this should be 
interpreted as ‘good’ growth using the definition implicit in the elasticity measure. From 
our point of view it is irrelevant whether the observed growth was due to new entrants 
into the labor market (supply effect), or whether the higher employment was due to 
(exogenous) growth (demand effect), either way it can be poverty reducing (or not). 
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What’s important is that we can link employment growth with GDP growth in a 
consistent and comparable way. In addition, the employment elasticity of growth looks at 
changes in the level of employment, so that it is unable to distinguish whether 
employment changed as a fraction of the total labor force.  We believe that what matters 
for poverty reduction is not the absolute number of employed, but the number of 
employed relative to the labor force. 
 
From the empirical point of view, our main reservation with measuring employment 
intensive growth via the partial elasticity of employment with respect to growth, is with 
the way this measure is estimated, and that is, by assuming that both output and wages 
are exogenous. Aggregate wages will most likely be affected by employment growth, and 
output might very well increase due to employment growing4.  Moreover, it is rarely the 
case that enough data is available to adequately estimate the partial elasticity for a large 
number of countries, so studies often settle for using the total elasticity of 






∆ , which attributes all possible employment 
changes to total growth, when in fact many other forces, -including relative wage changes 
or demographic changes- might be generating the variations in employment.  
 
Followin Kakwani et al. (2006), a simple way of understanding how growth is associated 
into increases in productivity and employment at the aggregate level and by sectors, is to 
perform a simple decomposition of per capita GDP growth in three components: 
productivity changes, employment rate changes and demographic changes. To do so, note 
that per capita GDP, Y/N=y can be expressed as:  
 
Y Y E A
N E A N




* *y e aω=   
 
where Y is total value added, E is total employment, A is the total population of working 
age and N is total population. The ratio ω=Y /E corresponds to output per worker, e=E/A 
corresponds to the share of working age population employed and a=A/N corresponds to 
the inverse of the dependency ratio, that is the ratio of working age population to total 
population.  
 
From Equation 1 it is possible to decompose the change in per capita value added in two 
consecutive periods, ∆y, into the marginal contributions of each of its components using 
a Shapley decomposition. The Shapley decomposition approach is based on the marginal 
effect on the value of a variable or indicator, of eliminating each of the contributory 
factors in a sequence. The method then assigns to each factor the average of its marginal 
                                                 
4 See Hammermesh (1986, 1993) for a discussion about the difficulties of estimating elasticities from 
aggregate data. 
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contribution in all possible elimination sequences (see Shorrocks 1999). Let ω , and e  be 
the marginal contribution to the observed change in per capita value added, expressed as 
a fraction of observed growth, and a  be the marginal contribution of the inverse of the 
dependency ratio to change in per capita income, expressed as a fraction of growth, in 
other words, y y y ye a
y y y y
ω ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆+ + = .  
 
In this case e would indicate the share of total growth that can be linked to growth in the 
employment rate as measured by the ration between total employment and working age 
population. In other words, had all dependency rates and productivity levels stayed the 
constant, and employment rate growth been the observed one, then total growth 
consistent with this scenario would have been equal to ˆ ye e
y
∆
= . Although strictly 
speaking employment rates are measured as the fraction of the population that 
‘participates’ in the labor market that is employed, throughout this paper the term 
‘employment rate’ will refer to employment as a fraction of the working age population5. 
 
It is worth noting that there are no causality implications in this decomposition. Growth 
in employment rates might have caused increases in per capita value added or, or it might 
have been in the opposite direction, i.e. increases in per capita value added might have 
generated more employment. Whatever the causality, ê  is the growth consistent with the 
hypothetical scenario in which all other things had stayed equal, and the employment rate 
had changed as observed.  In this way ˆ * /e e y y= ∆  reflects how much growth can be 
linked to employment rate growth and has the natural interpretation of employment 
intensive growth. Note again that we are measuring employment intensive growth with 
respect to changes in the employment rate, rather than the employment level. 
 
The interpretation of the productivity term ω  is not so straight forward. It combines both 
increases in productivity due to technological change or reorganization of the process of 
production as well as cyclical changes in demand. Firms operating in economic 
downturns may have underutilized labor and capital, when the demand increases again; it 
will be reflected as an increase in productivity. This means that cyclical behavior of 
output will be reflected as changes in productivity, and this term has thus a wider 
interpretation that just technological change. This cyclical change in output per worker 
might be particularly important in the short run. ˆ y
y
ω ω ∆=  will then be the amount of 
growth in per capita value added that can be linked to productivity growth. 
 
The component a  reflects changes in the demographic structure of the population. For 
example, despite rises in labor productivity and employment, countries with a rapidly 
rising young population may see a decline in per capita income, if the employment and 
                                                 
5 In developing countries and in particular in low income countries measuring participation is extremely 
difficult. In many cases unemployment is very low but the inactive include agents that are seasonally 
unemployed and large numbers of discouraged workers. We believe that in these cases a better measure of 
labor force is the working age population, rather than those participating actively in the labor market. 
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productivity growth is not enough to counteract the growing dependency ratio. The same 
might happen with countries that have rapidly aging population.  ˆ ya a
y
∆
=  will then be 
the amount of growth in per capita value added that can be linked to changes in the 
dependency ratio, and (1 ) ya
y
∆
−  will be the amount of growth that can be linked to 
changes in output per working age person. 
 
 
We can further decompose changes in output as a share of the working age population 
Y E Y
E A A








Where Yi is value added in sector i, and there are s sectors in the economy. Let iy  denote 
the share of growth in aggregate value added per working age person that can be 




−  is the amount of growth in per 
capita value added that can be attributed to total value added growth in sector i. 
 
By the same token, growth in each sector can be decomposed into productivity and 







Where Ei is total employment in sector i. Let ie  denote the share of growth in sector i that 
can be linked to employment changes, and let iω  denote the fraction of growth in sector i, 
that can be linked to changes in output per worker. Then we can compute how much of 
aggregate per capita value added growth can be linked to employment growth in sector i 
as: 
ˆ *(1 )*i i i
ye y a e
y
∆
= −  
 
And the amount of aggregate per capita value added growth that can be linked to 
productivity growth in sector i, as: 
ˆ *(1 )*i i i
y y a
y
ω ω∆= −  
In other words, îe  is simply the product of the share of per capita value added growth due 
to output growth (1 a− ), times the share of total value added growth attributable to sector 
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i ( iy ), times the share of growth in sector i, attributable to employment growth in sector i 
( e ), times observed growth.  
 












= + +∑ ∑  
 
Our measure of aggregate employment intensive growth will thus be ê , our measure of 




= , and our measure of sector-i-employment intensive 
growth is îe . We believe that, for the specific purpose of understanding the link between 
employment intensive growth and poverty, the measure of employment intensive growth 
proposed has some advantages over the traditional employment elasticity of growth. The 
measure of employment intensive growth proposed in this paper is free of causality 
implications. It simply measures the growth and employment rates changes that are 
consistent with a particular productivity and population structure scenario (which is held 
constant), regardless of the source of this employment growth. In addition it measures 
employment intensive growth as growth linked to changes in the employment rate, rather 
than changes in absolute employment. 
 
 
1.2 The data 
To analyze whether employment matters for poverty reduction (sections 4 and 5) we 
make use of data on total and sectoral GDP, poverty, population and employment. The 
analysis covers the period ranging between 1980 and 2004, and uses a sample of 36 
developing countries. Data on total GDP comes from the World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. To construct sectoral GDP we use data from the United Nations 
National Accounts, which have the share of total GDP by sector. Data on population 
comes from the UN population division. Data on poverty is obtained from the World 
Bank Poverty database. Finally data on employment comes from ILO-KILM database. 
United Nations data on National accounts has value added disaggregated into seven 
sectors in accordance with ISCS-rev3 definitions: agriculture, hunting, forestry and 
fishing; mining and utilities: manufacturing; construction; wholesale, retail, restaurant 
and hotels; transport storage and communications and other activities. Poverty data from 
the World Bank in PovCalNet, lists several measures of poverty, several measures of 
income distribution and mean survey income. It is based on household surveys and 
measures welfare either by income or consumption.  
 
The KILM database has information for 20 indicators of the labor market, with several 
disaggregations each. It is the most comprehensive database for labor market outcomes 
available. It has however some limitations in terms of comparability across countries and 
within countries across time. The main difficulty for cross-country comparability is that 
definitions vary by country, and coverage of population and segments of the labor market 
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are not always the same. In particular, many countries report values for formal 
employment only, and others leave sectors such as agriculture out. The KILM database 
however, does provide information when this is the case, so that it is possible to control 
for differences in measurement and coverage. The main problem for within country 
comparisons is changes in sample or survey design. Again the database provides 
information of these breaks in the series. Finally, coverage for Sub-Saharan Africa is 
particularly low.  We use indicators on employment by sector. The database presents data 
for both ISCS revision 2 and revision 3, when ever revision 3 is available for a country 
year we use this last classification system, otherwise we use the available information 
using revision 2. In either case we make sectoral aggregations consistent with the level of 
sectoral aggregation of UN national accounts information on GDP by sector of economic 
activity.  
 
To establish the extent to which labor market conditions play any role in explaining the 
pattern of growth (section  4) we use data on labor regulation from Rama and Artecona 
(2002); and Sulla, Scarpeta and Pierre (mimeo World Bank), which covers a substantial 
amount of topics on regulation and labor institutions. 
 
To profile growth in terms of employment and productivity by sectors we construct short 
run ‘growth spells’. For each country, short run growth spells are constructed as the 
percentage change in Value Added per capita (VA) between two consecutive comparable 
points in time. One country may have several growth spells. For each growth spell in VA 
the corresponding changes in employment to labor force ratios (E/A) by sectors, value 
added per worker (Y/E) by sectors, and ratio of labor force to total population (A/N) are 
constructed. To link the profile of growth to poverty, the corresponding changes in 
poverty headcount ratio are constructed. Care is taken to make sure that the spells are in 
fact comparable in time. In particular, we take into consideration that within a spell, 
measured poverty is constructed using the same welfare indicator (income or 
consumption) and employment numbers have the same coverage (total or urban). 
Consistency in employment measures by sectors is obtained by taking into account 
breaks in employment series emanating either from changes in coverage or sample, so 
that within a spell employment is measured using the same sample and coverage. The 
average duration of the short run spells is 2.2 years with the longest spell being eight 
years.  
 
Table 1 describes the covered sample. There is a very low number of low income 
countries as well as a very low number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa or the Middle 
East and North Africa. The main data limitations come from employment data, which 
have very low coverage in these regions. This implies that the analysis may describe 









Table 1: Sample description 
Countries grouped by Region 










By Region       
Sub-Saharan Africa 48 2 4.2% 
East Asia and the Pacific 24 5 20.8% 
Europe and Central Asia 27 9 33.3% 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 31 17 54.8% 
Middle East and North Africa 14 1 7.1% 
South Asia 8 3 37.5% 
Total 152 37 24.3% 
        
By Income level       
Low Income 53 6 11.3% 
Lower Middle Income 58 20 34.5% 
Upper Middle Income 41 11 26.8% 
Total 152 37 24.3% 
 
 
2 Does aggregate employment intensity of growth 
matter for poverty reduction? 
 
As mentioned before, there has seen a growing concern amongst policy makers with 
‘jobless’ growth as a major obstacle to the poor benefiting from the positive growth 
performance experienced by many countries worldwide. Behind this emphasis is the 
implicit assumption that employment generation plays an important role in reducing 
poverty, as the poor derive most of their income/consumption from work, as employees, 
self-employed or in subsistence activities. This emphasis in employment intensive growth 
on the other hand, seems to downplay the importance of the quality of the employment 
generated, i.e. the overall productivity intensity of growth. In many cases productivity 
intensive growth is thought of as a process by which labor is substituted for capital and 
thus decreases employment and increases poverty.  
 
The relative importance of productivity and employment changes on poverty reduction 
depends on the workings of the labor markets and the structure of employment. In a 
simple supply and demand framework, with no frictions or barriers to mobility, the 
economy is always at ‘full employment’, employment rates are always one and so there 
would be nothing as ‘employment (rate) intensive growth’. Since we defined employment 
intensive growth as growth that is accompanied by increases in the employment rate, we 
need to depart from the competitive markets to tackle this question. 
 
In models with friction and barriers to mobility (e.g. matching models), or in models of 
labor market segmentation there is space for employment intensive growth, that is growth 
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that is accompanied by increases in the employment rate. There are many ways in which 
frictions, barriers to mobility or segmentation might affect the ability of GDP growth to 
translate into employment generation and poverty reduction.  
 
Indeed of the theoretical literature on labor markets in developing emphasizes the duality 
and segmentation of these labor markets6. At the core of this model is the idea that there 
is a ‘bad job sector’ and a ‘good job sector’.7 In the good jobs sector productivity is 
higher and so wages are higher. In the bad jobs sector productivity is low and income 
from self employment/wages is low. Given that productivity in the bad jobs sectors is low 
households that earn a living in the bad job sector are more likely to be poorer than the 
rest. Jobs in the good jobs sectors are rationed because wages are institutionally set above 
the competitive market clearing level. There may be minimum wages, unions may 
bargain for higher wages, firms may set ‘efficiency wages’ etc. Movement between the 
bad jobs sector and the good jobs sector may be limited, and people ‘queue’ for a good 
job. On top of the limited mobility created by institutionally set wages, there may be 
geographic barriers to mobility. For example many bad sector jobs may be in rural areas 
and migration to urban areas may be costly and risky, as there may be lack roads and few 
property rights enforcement on land for those who leave their land. There may also be 
barriers to mobility due to discrimination and segregation, as good jobs may only be 
given to those of certain ethnic group or to a particular gender. Similarly, good jobs may 
be reserved for those with a certain level of education so that the unskilled poor may be 
completely left out of the good jobs sector8. 
 
How can the employment intensity of growth affect poverty reduction under such model? 
Let’s begin by assuming that population growth is zero and that the structure of the 
population (working age/non working age) remains unaltered. Assume also that the 
economy can be divided into three sectors: a bad jobs sector where productivity and 
earnings are low and two good jobs sector, where productivity and earning are high and 
where, for now, skill and employment intensity are the same. Assume also that a fraction 
of the labor force is unemployed.  
 
Under the hypothesis of perfect mobility an exogenous economy wide increase in the 
demand for the goods produced in the good jobs sector -say due to larger foreign 
demand- this growth will increase demand for labor in the good jobs and draw people out 
of the bad jobs and out of unemployment and thus reduce poverty. This means that if 
                                                 
6 Labor market segmentation is now part of the standard labor economic textbooks (see, for example, Borjas [1996], 
Bosworth et al. [1996], and Layard, Nickel, and Jackson [1991]). The main reason is that it offers a better explanation 
for some empirical observations than the competitive model. An often-quoted example is the persistent existence of 
intra-industry wage differentials for observationally equivalent workers (Katz and Summers 1988). For other 
contributions, see Dickens and Lang (1988) and Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989). 
 
7 The bad jobs sector is usually associated with agricultural sector or the informal sector and the ‘good jobs 
sector’ is generally associated with the industrial or modern sector or the formal sector, we believe that this 
distinctions may be too simplifying and that the division of the labor market between good and bad jobs, 
goes beyond the formal/informal or agricultural/industrial divide. 
8 For example, in several African economies the best jobs are those in the public sector, and only the 
educated ones have access to these. In Nicaragua, to be able to work in many of the maquila firms you are 
required to have completed secondary.   
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there are no barriers to mobility growth will reduce poverty by pulling poor people into 
the good jobs. 
 
But growth may impact demand for labor, depending for example on the production 
technology and relative prices of labor versus capital. Compare for example two 
countries that face the same relative prices of labor, but one country has a production 
technology that is more intensive in labor than the other. The country with the high 
employment intensity will generate a higher demand for labor for every percentage point 
of growth, and thus might be able to bring more people out of the bad jobs sector and into 
the good jobs sector and more people out of unemployment. The reduction in the 
unemployment rate will be reflected as employment intensive growth, and the higher the 
number of people pulled out of unemployment the larger the effect on poverty. In other 
words the overall employment intensity of growth will matter. Note however that while 
the movement out of unemployment will be reflected in higher employment rates, the 
movement of workers from the bad jobs sector into the good jobs sector will be reflected 
as an increase in output per worker i.e. as productivity intensive growth. Thus larger 
movements out of the bad jobs sector and into the good jobs sector will be reflected in a 
higher productivity intensity of growth. Thus productivity intensive growth will be related 
to poverty reduction. 
 
What about productivity growth in the good jobs sector? This is a hard question, because 
it depends on the definition of productivity, the source of its and the way it reflects on 
output demand. If we measure productivity as output per worker, then we have to 
differentiate between the short run and the long run. In the short run we can consider the 
capital stock to be fixed so that any increase in productivity (measured as output per 
worker) can be equated with increases in TFP. This means that firms can produce the 
same amount of output at lower level of inputs and thus lower costs. Under 
monopolistically competitive markets for output, they would thus be able to sell at lower 
prices than other competitors and increase their share of the market. Two different effects 
will work in opposite directions: a) fewer workers are needed per unit of output b) more 
output is being sold. In the extreme case where total demand for goods stays constant and 
does not increase, then the demand for labor will be reduced, workers will be shed to the 
bad jobs sectors or to unemployment and poverty will increase. In the short run 
productivity increases in the good jobs sector may have an ambiguous effect on poverty 
depending on the effect of higher productivity on the demand for labor. 
 
What about productivity growth in the good jobs sector and its effects on wages? In the 
above discussion we are assuming wages are not affected by productivity increases. 
Clearly, with higher productivity firms are having higher profits (less costs same or more 
output). Whether higher productivity translates into higher wages will depend on the 
wage setting mechanisms. Under bargaining models or union set wages this will clearly 
raise the pressure to increase wages. Wage increase may decrease poverty if poor 
households have a combination of income from both bad jobs sector and good jobs 
sector.  This means that productivity increases in the good jobs sector may reduce 
poverty if it translates in rising wages, depending on the composition of the sources of 
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household labor income among the poor. If poor households have at least some income 
from wage employment in the good jobs sector then poverty is likely to decrease. 
 
2.1 What do the stylized facts say?  
Figure 1 presents stylized facts on the empirical link between growth and poverty 
changes in all countries for which data were available. It shows how poverty changes and 
per capita value added growth are correlated with changes in productivity, employment 
rates and the inverse of the dependency ratio. Productivity is defined as value added per 
worker. Employment rates are measured as the number of employed as a fraction of the 
working age population9. The inverse of the dependency ratio is the ratio of total working 
age population to total population. Each data point in the figure illustrates a growth spell 
for a country. A growth spell is simply the percentage change in the variables of interest 
between two points in time. The spells are short and medium run: on average each spell 
lasts 2 years, and most spells are between one and 4 years (Section  1.2 discusses further 
the data) 
 
The first row of plots in Figure 1 illustrates how percentage changes in headcount 
poverty correlate with percentage changes in productivity (first plot), employment rates 
(second plot) and the inverse of the dependency rate (third plot). All of these components 
seem to be negatively correlated with poverty, although the correlations appear to be 
small and the confidence intervals (the shaded area) large. The positive correlation is 
perhaps not very surprising: higher value added per worker can translate into higher labor 
income either via higher wages or higher profits from self employment, and thus it can 
reduce poverty. Higher employment rates would imply more people working and thus 
more people earning. Lower dependency rates mean that each working age member has 
to support a lower number of dependants on his/her income. The second row of plots in 
the figure illustrates the correlation between per capita value added and the same three 
components. The strong positive correlation between changes in productivity and per 
capita value added stands out, meaning that productivity growth and per capita value 
added growth are strongly correlated. Changes in employment as well in as the inverse of 
the dependency ratio are also positively correlated with increases in  per capita value 
added, but there confidence intervals are substantially wider, suggesting the relation is 
less strong. From this simple approach it seems that changes the in employment rate and 
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2.2 Empirical results  
The relationships discussed above can be more rigorously answered using regression 
analysis. We present four different sets of estimations. The first analyzes the relation 
between growth in overall per capita value added and poverty changes. The second asses 
the extent to which the aggregate employment intensity of growth matters. For each set of 
regressions several models where estimated, the basic model (column 1 in all the tables) 
corresponds to the full sample and no controls. The other models exclude outliers and/or 
include control variables.  
 
Following Bourguignon (2002), we include as controls all those variables that may affect 
the responsiveness of poverty to growth: value added per capita at the beginning of the 
spell, the level of inequality at the beginning of the spell, the level of poverty at the 
beginning of the spell and the change in income inequality at the beginning of the spell. 
These variables may also be correlated with our dependent variable. Specifically, higher 
levels of inequality may promote pro-capital or pro-labor policies. Changes in the 
distribution may affect the sectoral pattern of growth, and the level of income may also 
be associated with more or less pro-worker or pro-capita legislation. 
 
If our assertion according to which ‘overall growth should reduce poverty by dragging 
people out of the bad jobs and into the good jobs’ is true then increases in GDP per capita 
(∆y/y) should be associated with decreases in poverty (∆P/P), and we should expect a 






β β∆ ∆= +  
Equation 3 
 
Table 2 shows the results of estimating Equation 1. Columns one and three refer to the 
whole sample. Columns two and four estimate the equation excluding outliers. The 
results when excluding the outliers support the hypothesis: that growth in value added 
reduces poverty, and the results are robust to the inclusion of controls. 
 
To determine whether the overall employment intensity of growth matters we would need 
to decompose total growth into the fraction linked to productivity increases and 
employment increases. We can use the results from the decomposition and estimate: 
 
0 1 1 1ˆˆ ˆ
P e a
P
β β β ω β∆ = + + +  
Equation 4 
 
Our right hand side variable is ∆P/P and our left hand side variables are expressed in the 
form ˆ * /x x y y= ∆ , for ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( , , )x e aω∈  This means that a coefficient on x̂  of say 10, should 
be interpreted as meaning that a 1% x-intensive-growth, reduces the head count poverty 
ratio by 10%. 
 
  
Table 3 shows the results of estimating Equation 4. The overall productivity intensity of 
growth is negatively correlated with poverty changes, that is productivity intensive 
growth is poverty reducing. Employment intensive growth appears to be poverty reducing 
also but the significance is much lower and only significant when outliers are excluded. 
to check whether there is any difference between employment intensive growth and 
productivity intensive growth we test for equality of the coefficients. Equality of 
coefficients can’t be rejected for models 1, 2 and 4 (but it is rejected for model 3), so that 
it is appears that the impact of overall productivity intensive growth is no different from 
employment intensive growth. If anything, we can conclude that it is productivity 
















Table 2: Changes in poverty and overall growth.  










Change in Y/N (%) -2.185 -2.546*** -3.673 -2.521*** 
 (-0.95) (-2.82) (-1.64) (-2.78) 
     
Gini at t=0   -0.0498*** -0.0111 
   (-2.69) (-1.61) 
     
Y/N at t=0   0.0000364 0.0000465 
   (0.39) (1.43) 
     
Poverty at t=0   -0.0185 -0.00392 
   (-1.07) (-0.62) 
     
Change in Gini (%)   7.481*** 2.588*** 
   (3.68) (3.34) 
     
Constant 0.416** 0.122* 2.764*** 0.435 
 (2.07) (1.71) (3.27) (1.35) 
     
Observations 109 102 109 102 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001 0.064 0.198 0.190 
t statistics in parentheses   
























Table 3: Poverty changes and the employment/productivity intensity of growth 










Inverse of dependency 
A/N  -2.675 -5.373 3.944 -2.818 
 (-0.17) (-0.82) (0.27) (-0.44) 
     
Value added per worker 
Y/E -3.151 -2.282** -5.404** -2.352** 
 (-1.26) (-2.31) (-2.30) (-2.39) 
     
Employment rate E/A -0.536 -3.404* -1.898 -3.355* 
 (-0.20) (-1.90) (-0.77) (-1.99) 
     
Gini at t=0   -0.0564*** -0.0102 
   (-3.07) (-1.42) 
     
Y/N at t=0   0.0000544 0.0000468 
   (0.59) (1.40) 
     
Poverty at t=0   -0.0203 -0.00355 
   (-1.20) (-0.55) 
     
Change in Gini (%)   7.328*** 2.625*** 
   (3.64) (3.35) 
     
Constant 0.417 0.147 2.913*** 0.387 
 (1.61) (1.58) (3.34) (1.09) 
     
Observations 109 102 109 102 
Adjusted R-squared 0.002 0.051 0.226 0.176 
     
t statistics in parentheses     
* p<.10,   ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
3 If the overall employment intensity of growth does 
not matter, then what matters? 
 
It has often been argued that what is important for poverty reduction is not overall 
employment growth, but the sectoral pattern of growth. A growing literature has focused 
on understanding the determinants of the growth elasticity of poverty (i.e. differences in 
poverty’s response to growth). Initial levels of inequality, individual endowments of 
physical and human capital, stabilization from high inflation, the size of government, 
labor productivity in agriculture and the regional and sectoral patter of growth, have all 
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been emphasized in past work as driving forces behind the differences in the degree to 
which growth reduces poverty10.  
 
Loayza and Raddatz (2006) consider the growth impact in unskilled labor intensive 
sectors. The findings show that growth in unskilled intensive sectors contributed to 
explain poverty reduction after controlling for average growth. Ravallion and Datt (Op. 
Cit), which links sectoral value added growth to poverty changes in India, and finds that 
growth in agriculture helped reduce poverty while growth in manufacturing did not. 
World Bank (2005) found evidence indicating that the ability to migrate enabled the rural 
poor to benefit from growth. It also concluded that access to non-farm rural employment 
and informal urban employment facilitated the participation of the poor in the growth 
process. Additionally, in three of the fourteen countries studied pro-poor growth was 
associated with more labor intensive growth11. In a related analysis, Islam (2004) uses a 
cross-country sample of 23 developing countries to determine whether the employment 
intensity of growth in manufacturing contributes to explain poverty reduction, but finds 
that results are not robust to the inclusion of per capita GDP growth. Often the discussion 
has focused on whether growth should be concentrated on the sectors where the poor are 
(usually agriculture) or on sector where the poor are not (manufacturing), so that these 
sectors can pull the poor out of the low return sectors (Fields 2005), but empirical 
evidence to illuminate this debate has been scant. In this section we try to address these 
issues.  
 
3.1 What do the stylized facts say? 
 
 Figure 2 illustrates how changes in poverty and value added per capita, are correlated 
with changes in productivity -value added per worker- for three selected sectors 
(manufacturing, construction and agriculture). A simple look at the figure suggests that 
there might be important differences. For example growth in output per worker in 
agriculture seems to be strongly correlated with poverty reduction, while productivity 
growth in manufacturing and construction does not seem to have any clear effect on 
poverty (first row of plots). On the other hand, changes in productivity in all sectors seem 
to be positively associated with overall productivity increases, with no significant 
differences among sectors. 
 
Finally, Figure 3 illustrates how changes in poverty and changes in per capita value 
added are correlated with employment growth in the selected sectors. Clearly there are 
differences among sectors. While employment growth in agriculture is associated with 
growing poverty, employment growth in manufacturing and construction seems to be 
associated with decreases in poverty. In other words, within countries, when employment 
in agriculture grows as a share of total working age population, poverty increases. It is 
worth highlighting that these are changes within 2 years (on average). The relationship 
between changes in overall per capita value added and employment rates in the different 
                                                 
10 See for example, Dollar and Kraay (2002), Kraay (2006), Ravallion (2005), Ravallion and Chen (2004), 
Ravallion and Datt (2002), Loayza and Raddatz (2006), and Bourguignon (Op. Cit).   
11 These where Indonesia, Vietnam, and Tunisia. 
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sectors are also different. Increases in employment in agriculture seem to be negatively 
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3.2 Why would the sectoral employment and productivity profile 
of growth matter for poverty reduction? 
 
Although in a competitive model although there is no role for employment intensive 
growth, the sectoral pattern of growth can affect the degree to which growth translates 
into poverty reduction. In a competitive model growth in one particular sector would 
increase demand for labor and rise wages everywhere uniformly, but how much upward 
pressure is exerted will depend on how much labor the growing sector is demanding. 
More labor intensive sector will generate a higher demand for labor per ‘unit’ of growth –
e.g. a one percent growth in an employment intensive sector will exert a higher pressure 
on wages than a one percent growth in a capital intensive sector-. Growth in sectors such 
as agriculture (which is mostly labor intensive in developing countries) would be more 
poverty reducing that say growth in high tech manufacturing or utilities, which could be 
less labor intensive (See Loayza and Raddatz (Op. Cit.) for a model that deals with this 
mechanism). In this case sectoral growth would be reflected in changes of the 
employment share of the different sectors, but overall, there would be no employment 
intensive growth. The only mechanism by which growth would affect poverty is by 
affecting wages. 
 
In the dual models discussed before, there is scope for both changes in the sectoral share 
of employment and employment intensive growth. As before, assume that the economy is 
composed of a good jobs sector and a bad jobs sector; and that within the good jobs 
sector there are two sub-sectors. Assume there is no population growth and no changes in 
the structure of the population (working age/non working age). As in the previous section 
an exogenous economy wide increase in the demand for goods in the good jobs sector, 
will have the same impact on labor demand independently of the sectoral distribution of 
growth, if both sub-sectors within the good jobs sector have the same employment 
intensity and the same productivity. However, if sectors differ with respect to their 
employment intensity (and/or skill intensity) then the sectoral pattern of growth will 
matter. Let’s compare say manufacturing and finance. The first is tends to be more 
employment intensive than the second, so that a 1% growth in manufacturing is likely to 
pull more labor out of the bad jobs sector and of unemployment than a 1% growth in 
finance (all else equal). This will imply that, growth in employment intensive sectors 
(and particularly in unskilled intensive sector) might be more efficient in pulling people 
out of poverty. Thus the sectoral pattern of growth matters for poverty reduction. 
 
Growth may also be reflected or accompanied by changing skill intensities within sub-
sectors. Firms may choose more or less employment intensive techniques when 
responding to increasing demand. For example some sectors may meet rising demand 
easily through higher labor while others may meet it through higher productivity.  Even if 
the two sub-sectors experience the same amount of growth, but one sector rises 
productivity while the other rise labor demand, then they will have differing amounts of 
impact on poverty so that sectoral employment and productivity intensity within sectors 
will matter for poverty reduction. 
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What about employment intensive growth in the bad jobs sector? If there is no population 
growth nor structural changes of the labor force, employment intensive growth in the bad 
jobs sector can only occur as a result of shrinking employment in the good jobs sector. 
This means that poverty will always increase as a consequence of this and employment 
intensive growth in the bad jobs sector will increase poverty. 
 
Now consider the case where the bad jobs sector has an increase in productivity or in 
demand (or both). Since we said most of the poor are earning income from this sector,  
poverty will immediately be reduced (or at least its depth). This means that productivity 
intensive growth in the sectors where the poor are should reduce poverty, regardless of 
whether there are or not barriers to mobility. 
 
Will it matter which sector among the good jobs sector experiences the productivity 
intensive growth? As with employment intensive growth discussed above, the sectoral 
pattern of productivity growth will matter. If the overall effect of productivity increases is 
to shed labor into the bad jobs sector and into unemployment, the more labor intensive a 
sector is the bigger its effect on increasing poverty. If the overall effect of productivity 
increases is an increase in the demand for labor, the opposite will be true. Productivity 
intensive growth in the good job sectors matters, but its effects will depend on the final 
effect on employment and wages. 
 
The above discussion assumed that there are not extensive barriers to mobility between 
the good and bad jobs sectors. If there are extensive barriers to mobility then increasing 
demand for labor in the good job sector will only push wages up, and growth will not be 
employment intensive. The overall effect on poverty will depend on the structure of 
household income; if at least some members in poor households have access to good jobs 
the poverty may be reduced12. With extensive barriers to mobility the only type of growth 
that is likely to be poverty reducing is productivity intensive growth in the bad jobs 
sector. 
 
3.3 Results: it is the sectoral employment and productivity 
intensity that matters   
 
We now turn to the sectoral pattern of growth. From our discussion in section  3 we 
concluded that ‘the sectoral pattern of growth matters for poverty reduction’. To test this 










= +∑  
Equation 5 
 
                                                 
12 This issue can only be adequately analyzed answered at a country level using household data. 
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where iy  is the share of total growth attributable to sector i, and S the number of sectors. 
Table 4 shows the estimation results of Equation 5 using a seven sector disaggregation. 
We present two set of outliers, the columns termed outliers 1 only excludes those 
observation with outliers in the poverty data. Only growth in services appears to be 
significantly associated with poverty reduction. Manufacturing appears to be poverty 
reducing when the whole sample is used, but this result is not robust to outliers.  
 
We also estimate Equation 5 using a three sector aggregation. We leave agriculture as the 
primary sector, and aggregate manufacturing mining and construction into ‘secondary 
sector’ and services, transport and communication and other sectors as ‘tertiary sector’. 
The results are shown in Table 5. Contrary to results in previous literature agriculture 
does not seem to be associated with poverty reduction. Growth in the secondary and 
tertiary sectors appears to be associated with poverty reduction but the results are not 
robust to the model specification. Moreover, the null hypothesis that the coefficients of 

































Table 4: Poverty changes and the sectoral pattern of growth. Seven sector disaggregation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 full sample No outliers 1 No outliers 2 Full sample No outliers 1 No outliers 2 
       
Agriculture (Primary Sector) 14.29 -0.635 -3.465 12.25 0.157 -1.505 
 (1.49) (-0.15) (-0.77) (1.37) (0.04) (-0.35) 
       
Manufacturing -25.07*** -1.734 0.0886 -25.29*** -4.552 -2.203 
 (-4.01) (-0.57) (0.03) (-4.45) (-1.55) (-0.66) 
       
Mining 10.51 -1.824 -1.606 7.799 -2.524 -2.601 
 (1.21) (-0.57) (-0.48) (0.94) (-0.80) (-0.79) 
       
Construction 9.115 -4.686 -6.236 25.89** 2.751 0.726 
 (0.70) (-0.96) (-1.23) (2.06) (0.56) (0.14) 
       
Services -5.571 -9.317** -9.579** -5.658 -8.821** -9.966** 
 (-0.51) (-2.30) (-2.18) (-0.53) (-2.20) (-2.31) 
       
Transport & Communications 47.43*** 5.136 2.090 16.70 0.886 -1.714 
 (2.81) (0.73) (0.29) (1.00) (0.13) (-0.25) 
       
Commerce and other -0.0413 0.245 2.702 -4.985 -1.993 0.172 
 (-0.01) (0.09) (0.95) (-0.79) (-0.80) (0.06) 
       
Gini at t=0    -0.0381** -0.0105 -0.00866 
    (-2.11) (-1.51) (-1.22) 
       
Y/N at t=0    0.0000417 0.0000387 0.0000355 
    (0.47) (1.13) (1.02) 
       
Poverty at t=0    -0.0206 -0.00737 -0.00741 
    (-1.19) (-1.11) (-1.09) 
       
Change in Gini (%)    7.880*** 2.625*** 2.638*** 
    (3.84) (3.23) (3.22) 
       
Constant 0.139 0.0398 0.000336 2.075** 0.458 0.350 
 (0.74) (0.57) (0.00) (2.44) (1.39) (1.02) 
       
Observations 109 105 98 109 105 98 
Adjusted R-squared 0.165 0.048 0.055 0.313 0.179 0.176 
t statistics in parentheses       










Table 5: poverty changes and sectoral growth. Three sector disaggregation 














       
Agriculture (Primary 
Sector) 6.482 -2.088 -4.735 7.134 -2.455 -3.686 
 (0.69) (-0.52) (-1.11) (0.82) (-0.64) (-0.91) 
       
Secondary Sector 
-
9.887*** -2.684* -2.334 -7.494** -2.419 -1.960 
 (-2.63) (-1.67) (-1.37) (-2.13) (-1.58) (-1.19) 
       
Tertiary Sector 5.129 -2.214* -1.527 -0.198 -2.662** -2.357 
 (1.41) (-1.68) (-1.03) (-0.05) (-2.03) (-1.64) 
       
Gini at t=0    -0.0423** -0.0107 -0.00927 
    (-2.25) (-1.56) (-1.31) 
       
Y/N at t=0    0.0000279 0.0000484 0.0000490
    (0.30) (1.45) (1.43) 
       
Poverty at t=0    -0.0201 -0.00347 -0.00307 
    (-1.17) (-0.56) (-0.48) 
       
Change in Gini (%)    7.407*** 2.595*** 2.719*** 
    (3.49) (3.36) (3.42) 
       
Constant 0.281 0.0783 0.0531 2.392*** 0.378 0.280 
 (1.46) (1.16) (0.74) (2.79) (1.20) (0.85) 
       
Observations 109 105 98 109 105 98 
Adjusted R-squared 0.049 0.037 0.025 0.210 0.178 0.165 
       
T statistics in parentheses     
* p<.10,  ** p<.05,  *** p<.01      
 
Finally, we turn to the sectoral employment intensity of growth by estimating: 
 
0 1 1
ˆˆS Si i i ii i
P e
P
β β γ ω
= =
∆




Where as mentioned before îe  reflects how much of the observed growth can be linked to 
(relative) increases in employment in sector i; and  ˆiω  corresponds to the amount of 
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growth that can be linked to changes in productivity in sector i13. Since employment 
intensity and productivity intensity are highly correlated within sectors, we decided to 
break the estimation in two steps. A first estimation looks at changes in poverty and the 
amount of growth due to employment changes in each sector. A second estimation 
analyzes the changes in poverty against productivity intensive growth. We estimated 
Equation 6 for the seven sectors and for three sectors aggregation.  
 
Table 6 illustrates the results for employment intensive growth. It stands out that growth 
associated with increases in agricultural employment within a country (agricultural 
employment intensive growth), are associated with increases in poverty. This result is 
robust to the inclusion of outliers and controls and highly significant. Growths that can be 
linked to increases in employment shares in manufacturing seem to be associated with 
poverty reduction but the result seems to be largely driven by outliers. If agriculture is a 
residual sector that absorbs the surplus labor from the good jobs sector then these results 
would support our claim that ‘employment intensive growth in the bad jobs sector should 
increase poverty’. 
 
The joint hypothesis that construction, manufacturing and mining and utilities have equal 
coefficients, and that services, communication and transport, and other sectors have the 
same coefficients, could not be rejected in any of the specification. We thus estimate a 
three sector aggregation. Table 7 illustrates the results. Poverty increases are positively 
associated with agricultural employment intensive growth. The result is statistically 
significant the 5% and 1% levels in 5 out of three specifications. On the other hand, 
secondary sector employment intensive growth is associated with decreases in poverty. 
The result is statistically significant at the 1% level for all of the model’s specifications. 
If the secondary sector concentrates most of the good jobs sector then this result would 
support our claim that ‘ …(the) sectoral employment intensity of growth will matter and 
employment intensity in the good jobs sector should pull people out of poverty’. 
Moreover, a test of whether the coefficients are equal was rejected in five of the 6 
specification. Three of the rejections are at the 1% confidence level. 
 
The second set of estimations analyzes the relationship between sectoral productivity 
intensive growth and poverty reduction. As before, we consider 6 different specifications 
and 2 aggregations. Table 8 shows the seven sector disaggregation. In five out of the six 
specifications, productivity intensive growth in agriculture reduces poverty, and the 
results are significant at the 5% confidence level. In other specification productivity 
intensive growth in manufacturing and services reduces poverty but results are not robust 
to the exclusion/inclusion of outliers or controls. We test equality of coefficients to see 
whether we can aggregate sectors into the three basic groups. Equality of the coefficients 
could not be rejected in several of the model’s specifications, suggesting that a three 




                                                 
13 Again we estimate this model for two sets of outliers, the first excludes those changes in poverty that are 
unusually big; and the second also considers outliers among the right regressors of Equation 6 
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Table 6: Poverty changes and sectoral employment intensity of growth 
















Employment share in Agriculture 
(Primary Sector) 15.63** 9.333** 6.823 18.72*** 10.63*** 8.509** 
 (2.19) (2.27) (1.56) (2.80) (2.74) (2.08) 
       
Employment share in Mining -0.817 -4.761 -4.124 -8.711 -6.567* -6.732* 
 (-0.08) (-1.25) (-1.04) (-0.87) (-1.82) (-1.83) 
       
Employment share in Manufacturing 
-
25.14*** -5.274 -5.989 -15.55* -3.632 -4.895 
 (-3.05) (-1.56) (-1.49) (-1.95) (-1.15) (-1.31) 
       
Employment share in Construction -7.720 -4.101 -6.300 -3.972 -1.722 -1.045 
 (-0.43) (-0.64) (-0.90) (-0.23) (-0.29) (-0.16) 
       
Employment share in Services 7.470 1.167 -0.412 3.871 1.596 0.656 
 (0.74) (0.27) (-0.08) (0.41) (0.40) (0.13) 
       
Employment share in Transport & 
Communications -11.81 -12.47 -12.10 -17.80 -14.91* -18.05* 
 (-0.47) (-1.36) (-1.14) (-0.76) (-1.73) (-1.83) 
       
Employment share in Commerce 
and other 2.591 1.332 -0.981 2.549 1.021 -2.334 
 (0.37) (0.54) (-0.31) (0.39) (0.44) (-0.80) 
       
Gini at t=0    -0.0409** -0.00811 -0.00637 
    (-2.21) (-1.21) (-0.92) 
       
Y/N at t=0    0.0000416 0.0000426 0.0000433
    (0.48) (1.37) (1.33) 
       
Poverty at t=0    -0.0118 -0.00141 -0.00335 
    (-0.74) (-0.25) (-0.57) 
       
Change in Gini (%)    6.590*** 2.877*** 3.086*** 
    (3.32) (3.83) (4.05) 
       
Constant 0.292 0.0692 0.0773 2.115*** 0.254 0.184 
 (1.50) (0.99) (1.03) (2.67) (0.86) (0.58) 
       
Observations 109 105 98 109 105 98 
Adjusted R-squared 0.159 0.096 0.087 0.287 0.237 0.248 
       
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<.10,  ** p<.05,  *** p<.01      
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Table 7: Poverty changes and sectoral employment intensity. Three sector disaggregation.   














Employment share in Agriculture 
(Primary Sector) 20.46*** 9.249** 7.273* 18.81*** 9.695** 7.925** 
 (3.58) (2.38) (1.77) (3.58) (2.62) (2.05) 
       
Employment share in Secondary 
Sector -15.02*** -5.270*** -5.704*** -11.83*** -4.689*** -5.194*** 
 (-3.27) (-2.89) (-2.93) (-2.77) (-2.75) (-2.89) 
       
Employment share in Tertiary 
Sector 0.271 -0.567 -2.432 -0.447 -0.748 -3.454* 
 (0.07) (-0.35) (-1.12) (-0.12) (-0.48) (-1.72) 
       
Gini at t=0    -0.0454** -0.00899 -0.00761 
    (-2.62) (-1.39) (-1.15) 
       
Y/N at t=0    0.0000503 0.0000486 0.0000446
    (0.60) (1.60) (1.42) 
       
Poverty at t=0    -0.0103 -0.00112 -0.00279 
    (-0.67) (-0.20) (-0.49) 
       
Change in Gini (%)    6.535*** 2.646*** 2.885*** 
    (3.41) (3.61) (3.90) 
       
Constant 0.326* 0.0638 0.0749 2.281*** 0.258 0.246 
 (1.75) (0.96) (1.07) (3.09) (0.90) (0.82) 
       
Observations 109 105 98 109 105 98 
Adjusted R-squared 0.162 0.114 0.112 0.309 0.244 0.260 
       
t statistics in parentheses      




Table 9 shows the results for a three sector disaggregation. The results do not change. 
productivity intensive growth in agriculture is associated with poverty reduction while 
productivity intensive growth in the secondary and tertiary sector have an ambiguous 
effect on poverty reduction. These results seem to support the claim that ‘In the short run, 
productivity increases in the good jobs sector may have an ambiguous effect on 
poverty…’’. 
 
In summary we find that overall employment intensive growth is not clearly associated 
with poverty reduction. Nor is the sectoral pattern of growth. What seems to matter most 
if the employment and productivity sectoral profile of growth. We find that employment 
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intensive growth in agriculture increases poverty, while employment intensive growth in 
the secondary sector reduces poverty. On the other hand productivity intensive growth in 
agriculture happens to reduce poverty, while productivity intensive growth in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors have an ambiguous effect on poverty. 
 
The magnitude of these effects is important: a 1% employment intensive growth in 
agriculture increases headcount poverty by around 7% (e.g. from 45% to 48%) to 20%. A 
1% employment intensive growth in manufacturing decreases poverty by 5% to 15%. 
Productivity intensive growth in agriculture reduces poverty by 7% to 10%. 
 
 
4 What determines whether a country experiences 
employment intensive growth or productivity growth? 
 
In the previous section we found that there are important differences between countries in 
the type of growth experienced, and that these differences are important for the poverty 
impact of growth. It is thus important to establish to what extent the observed growth 
patterns are the result of the underlying labor market characteristics.  
 
There is a vast literature that analyzes the effect of regulation on total employment or on 
the unemployment rate (For reviews see Heckman and Pages 2000, Arias et al. 2005, 
among others). Most of the literature concludes that labor regulation hinders employment 
creation and increases unemployment and that the impact of labor regulation on 
productivity growth has been underemphasized. Another strand of literature analyzes the 
effect of regulation on growth and/or poverty. Lustig and McLeod (1997), for example, 
analyze the impact of minimum wages on poverty in developing countries, while Besley 
and Burgess (2004) found that pro-poor worker regulation was associated with lower 
output growth and increases in urban poverty in India. The study on “Pro-Poor growth in 
the 1990’s” (World Bank 2005), found that highly regulated labor markets restricted the 
participation of the poor in economic growth. The focus of these studies has been overall 
employment or productivity growth rather than the employment/productivity intensity of 
growth, and very few of these studies consider sectoral differences. Additionally, factors 
other than labor regulation have received relatively little attention. The exception is 
perhaps a paper by Bentolila and Revenga (1995), who find that for OECD countries the 
employment intensity of growth is affected by the share of agriculture in total output, the 
level of firing costs, the degree of inter-union and inter-firm coordination and the 










Table 8: Poverty changes and sectoral productivity intensive growth. Seven sector dis-aggregation 














       
VA per worker in Agriculture 
(Primary Sector) -11.77** -6.983** -7.193** -6.798 -6.595** -6.654** 
 (-2.28) (-2.37) (-2.41) (-1.38) (-2.39) (-2.39) 
       
VA per worker in Mining -1.036 1.260 1.402 3.297 2.195 2.064 
 (-0.17) (0.52) (0.56) (0.57) (0.92) (0.84) 
       
VA per worker in Manufacturing -11.79 3.389 2.669 -18.75** 0.917 1.116 
 (-1.51) (1.13) (0.77) (-2.61) (0.32) (0.33) 
       
VA per worker in Construction 10.71 -2.702 -1.321 20.92 1.765 1.473 
 (0.76) (-0.53) (-0.24) (1.61) (0.36) (0.28) 
       
VA per worker in Services -7.203 -5.124* -5.859* -5.180 -4.193 -5.115* 
 (-0.97) (-1.82) (-1.87) (-0.77) (-1.55) (-1.69) 
       
VA per worker in Transport & 
Communications 43.95*** 7.191 6.223 21.44 6.161 4.548 
 (3.17) (1.23) (0.98) (1.61) (1.09) (0.75) 
       
VA per worker in Commerce and 
other -5.631 -0.258 1.206 -5.004 -0.242 1.245 
 (-1.32) (-0.16) (0.64) (-1.29) (-0.16) (0.70) 
       
Gini at t=0    
-
0.0542*** -0.0103 -0.00779 
    (-2.90) (-1.44) (-1.06) 
       
Y/N at t=0    0.000102 0.0000696** 0.0000615*
    (1.17) (2.15) (1.83) 
       
Poverty at t=0    -0.0106 0.00144 -0.000137 
    (-0.64) (0.23) (-0.02) 
       
Change in Gini (%)    7.097*** 2.452*** 2.537*** 
    (3.48) (3.10) (3.19) 
       
Constant 0.272 -0.00443 -0.0278 2.410*** 0.118 0.0291 
 (1.51) (-0.07) (-0.39) (2.92) (0.36) (0.08) 
       
Observations 109 105 98 109 105 98 
Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.042 0.048 0.270 0.169 0.176 
       
t statistics in parentheses     




Table 9: Poverty changes and sectoral productivity intensive growth. Three sector dissaggregation. 












       
VA per worker in Agriculture 
(Primary Sector) -10.48** -6.419** -7.283** -7.147 -6.753** -7.104** 
 (-2.28) (-2.23) (-2.49) (-1.64) (-2.53) (-2.60) 
       
VA per worker in Secondary 
Sector -2.337 1.796 1.898 -2.274 1.891 2.139 
 (-0.57) (1.13) (1.07) (-0.61) (1.24) (1.26) 
       
VA per worker in Tertiary 
Sector 1.725 -0.420 0.0411 -1.054 -0.375 0.0500 
 (0.64) (-0.39) (0.03) (-0.41) (-0.35) (0.04) 
       
Gini at t=0    -0.0547*** -0.0115* -0.00918 
    (-2.97) (-1.69) (-1.31) 
       
Y/N at t=0    0.000105 0.0000739** 0.0000674**
    (1.18) (2.31) (2.02) 
       
Poverty at t=0    -0.00990 0.00187 0.00174 
    (-0.58) (0.30) (0.28) 
       
Change in Gini (%)    6.677*** 2.477*** 2.614*** 
    (3.27) (3.25) (3.38) 
       
Constant 0.338* 0.0287 0.0249 2.420*** 0.172 0.0828 
 (1.88) (0.45) (0.37) (2.99) (0.55) (0.25) 
       
Observations 109 105 98 109 105 98 
Adjusted R-squared 0.042 0.026 0.038 0.222 0.173 0.177 
       
t statistics in parentheses     
* p<.10,   ** p<.05, *** p<.01     
 
 
In this section we explore the links between manufacturing and secondary sector labor 
intensive growth and some characteristics of the labor markets. We focus on labor 
intensive growth in these sectors because from section  3.3 we found that employment 
intensive growth in the secondary sector and the manufacturing sector ( ,ˆ j se  for s= 
manufacturing, secondary) are positively related to poverty reduction14. We thus test 
whether this pattern of growth can be explained by the selected variables.  In particular 
we explore whether the level of education, the share of workers in agriculture, and labor 
                                                 
14 We also use the percentage of growth that can be attributed to employment changes in manufacturing and 
the secondary sector but nothing appears significant.  
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market regulation affect manufacturing employment intensive growth and secondary 
sector employment intensive growth. Unfortunately we could not match our employment 
spells with any investment climate indicators or governance indicators as these datasets 
are few and are rather recent. Moreover, the data on labor regulation is scant and we were 
only able to match very few of the available regulation variables in the available datasets, 
with our growth-poverty spells data. For this reason these results should not be 




To estimate the impact of these underlying determinants we estimate the following 
equation:  
 
, 0ˆ ( , )ji j t je g Z X==  
Equation 7 
   
Where îje  the amount of growth explained by employment intensive growth in country j  
in the sector i; Zj,t=0, is a vector of possible explanatory variable in country j at the 
beginning of the spell (t=0) and Xj, are control variables. 
  
The Zj,t=0 vector includes regulation variables, the share of labor in agriculture and 
education. A large share of workers in agriculture may provide more ‘surplus labor’ to 
feed employment intensive growth, if there are no important barriers to moving away 
from this sector. Education levels may affect employment intensive growth by supplying 
(or not) the skill requirement of the growth process –e.g. low levels of education may 
imply a supply of cheap labor- but if the level of education is too low employment 
generation may be hampered. Finally, regulation may hamper or promote labor intensive 
growth by affecting the relative price of labor and the ease with which workers can be 
hired and fired. We also analyze the effect of bargaining, strikes and unions, since 
unionization and the number of strikes appear to be negatively related to growth (Rama 
and Artecona Op. Cit). We explore whether it also hampers employment intensive 
growth. 
 
We estimate several models. A first model includes all the data in the sample, a second 
model excludes outliers, and the third model includes some controls. In particular we 
include the initial level of inequality, as both regulation and employment intensive 
growth may be correlated with inequality, the initial level of poverty and changes in 
poverty. In a final model we include growth (∆y/y) to see whether the effect of regulation 
is capturing the effect of our regressor on growth itself.  
 
4.1.1 Regulation and unionization 
 
For regulation we use two sets of variables: i) those related to hiring restrictions and labor 
costs and ii) those related to unionization and strikes. The first group include the monthly 
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minimum wage in absolute value (US dollars) and the minimum wage relative to the 
average manufacturing wage; the duration of maternity leave; minimum annual paid 
leave after one year of work; social security contributions paid by the worker and the 
employers as a fraction of total salaries; and severance pay after three years of 
employment in months of salary. As for unionization, we explored the effect of total trade 
union membership as percent of the labor force, coverage of collective agreements as 
percent of salaried employment, number of strikes and lock-outs per year, annual work 
days lost to strikes and number of workers involved in strikes and lockouts. 
 
Table 10 and Table 14 in the appendix show the results of those variables that where 
significant15. The results suggest that only minimum wages (both in absolute terms and 
relative to manufacturing) and severance pay have any power in explaining 
manufacturing employment intensive growth ( ˆmanufacturinge ). Both are negatively correlated. 
When growth is included as an explanatory variable, the magnitude of the coefficient is 
reduced but the effect is still negative and significant. None of the unionization variables 
appear significant.  
 
When the dependent variable is the amount of growth that can be linked to employment 
growth in the secondary sector as a whole ( sec _ secˆ ondary tore ), the minimum wage is 
significant except when growth is included as a dependent variable. It appears then, that 
the minimum wage reduces growth, but it does not affect how secondary sector 
employment intensive this growth process is. Annual leave appears to have a positive 
effect, which is somewhat surprising. A possible explanation is that it might increase the 
supply of labor to this sector.  
 
4.1.2 Education and the structure of employment  
We begin by examining the relationship between our estimated employment intensive 
growth measure and poverty and inequality measures, after which we take a closer look 
at the role played by the share of workers in agriculture and by the level of education.  
The first row of plots in Figure 4 illustrates how employment intensive growth in 
manufacturing correlates with the initial level of poverty and changes in poverty (first 
plot), the initial level of inequality (second plot) and share of workers in agriculture (third 
plot). Initial poverty and inequality seems to be negatively correlated with manufacturing 
employment intensive growth, while, higher share of employment in agriculture seems to 
be positively correlated. 
 
The second row of plots in Figure 4 illustrates the correlation between employment 
intensive growth in manufacturing and three education level components: no schooling, 
completion of first, and of second level education. No schooling and primary education 
are positively correlated with our measure of employment intensive growth at higher 
overall levels of education (when the share of population with this level of education is 
low) and negatively correlated when the share of labor force with primary or no 
                                                 
15 Other results are available upon request. 
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education rises (i.e inverse U). However, confidence intervals for these components are 
substantially wider, suggesting the relation is may not be strong. 
 
 




We estimate Equation 7, for each of the variables considered. Table 15 and Table 16 in 
the appendix illustrate the results for those variables that had any explanatory power16. 
They suggest that only the share of workers in agriculture has any power in explaining 
the amount of growth that can be linked to growth in the manufacturing sector. The 
regression term is positive and significant. When growth is included as an explanatory 
variable, the magnitude of the coefficient is not reduced and the effect is still positive and 
significant.  None of the education variables was significant (results are not included for 
brevity). The results are the same when the dependent variable is the amount of growth 
that can be linked to employment growth in the secondary sector as a whole.  
 
The lack of significance of the education variables may reflect several things. First there 
might be considerable heterogeneity in the quality of education among countries, so that a 
measure such as ‘share of workers with secondary’ might be capturing a very 
heterogeneous level of skills. Alternatively, education may have ambiguous effects on 
                                                 
16 Other results are available upon request. 
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fostering employment intensive growth. On one hand low levels of education may mean 
cheap labor to feed into employment intensive growth, but on the other hand it means low 
skills and low productivity of the labor force which might disincentive labor demand. 
Both effects may be canceling each other. The fact that the initial share of workers in 
agriculture fosters employment intensive growth may mean that the size of this sector is 
related to the amount of surplus labor that can feed into the growing labor demand of a 
labor intensive industrialization process, with out pushing wages up. 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we analyze the relationship between poverty reduction and the employment 
and productivity profile of growth, both at the aggregate level and by sectors. 
The framework used in this paper is inscribed within the segmented labor markets 
tradition.  
 
Although we do not provide a formal model of segmentation that explains the 
mechanisms at work, we provide an intuitive description of the implications of labor 
market segmentation for the poverty- growth linkages. We decompose per capita value 
added growth between labor market components (employment, productivity and 
demographic changes) and empirically analyze how each component affects poverty 
reduction. We also explore the role of the labor markets characteristics and the structure 
of employment, in the observed pattern of growth, and its poverty reducing effect. 
 
We complement existing literature on the subject mainly in two ways. First, we go 
beyond the simple sectoral pattern of growth, or its overall employment intensity and 
analyze the role of sectoral productivity and employment intensity, in poverty reduction. 
Second, we use a decomposition methodology first proposed by Kakwani et al. (Op. Cit), 
and extend it to show how it can be used to construct a measure of employment intensive 
growth. We believe this measure addresses some conceptual and empirical weaknesses of 
the more commonly used measure of employment intensive growth: the employment 
elasticity of growth. Our study also complements existing literature by including a larger 
fraction of countries among our sample. 
 
Using a sample of 111 spells, covering 37 countries, we find that both the sectoral pattern 
of growth as well as the employment/productivity profile varies significantly between 
countries. In the aggregate, the employment intensity of growth does not seem to matter 
for poverty reduction. But the sectoral pattern of employment generation and productivity 
growth is important. The results seem to suggest that employment intensive growth in the 
secondary sector reduces poverty, while more employment intensive growth in 
agriculture tends to increase it. By contrast, productivity intensive growth in agriculture 
has a significant poverty reducing impact. 
 
Evidence on the link between employment intensive growth and education or regulation 
is not very conclusive. There seems to be no clear correlation between schooling and 
employment intensive growth. As far as regulation is concerned, only minimum wages 
and severance pay seem to be correlated with employment intensive growth in 
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manufacturing. Unionization does not seem to affect the amount of growth linked to 
employment growth in manufacturing.   
 
The results appear to support the hypothesis of labor market segmentation with ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ sectors coexisting and movements from the later to the former increasing 
welfare and reducing poverty. The results imply that focusing on the overall employment 
elasticity of growth may not be an effective way to increase the poverty impact of 
growth. Thus it is important for policy makers to move beyond the aggregate figure of 
growth and its impact on employment and focus more on both the sectoral distribution of 
growth and its impact. Higher employment will reduce poverty only if it is concentrated 
on the good jobs sectors, mainly the secondary sector (manufacturing, construction 
mining and utilities). But focusing on rising productivity of agriculture will also reduce 
poverty. An additional priority for policy makers is to reduce the existing barriers to 
mobility between different segments of the labor market, being these geographic or skill 
related, or the results of gender or ethnic discrimination.  
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Appendix: estimation results on regulation and 
structural variables. 
  
Table 10: Absolute minimum wage and manufacturing employment intensive growth ˆmanufacturinge  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 full sample No outliers Controls Growth 
     
minimum wage 
-
0.000177*** -0.000177*** -0.000218*** -0.000140** 
 (-3.36) (-3.36) (-3.83) (-2.53) 
     
gini_t0   0.000330 0.000556* 
   (1.00) (1.86) 
     
h_t0   -0.000507 -0.000332 
   (-1.64) (-1.19) 
     
Changes in GDP per 
capita    0.120*** 
    (3.39) 
     
Constant 0.0198*** 0.0198*** 0.0113 -0.0155 
 (3.53) (3.53) (0.70) (-0.95) 
     
Observations 42 42 42 42 
Adjusted R-squared 0.201 0.201 0.241 0.405 
     
t statistics in parentheses    
="* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01"  
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Table 11 Relative minimum wage and manufacturing employment intensive growth ˆmanufacturinge  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
full 
sample No outliers Controls Growth 
minimum wage relative to 
average -0.0497** -0.0497** -0.0512** -0.0434*** 
 (-2.55) (-2.55) (-2.54) (-2.82) 
     
gini_t0   -0.000510 -0.000135 
   (-1.22) (-0.41) 
     
h_t0   0.000331 0.000946 
   (0.44) (1.62) 
     
Changes in GDP per capita    0.153*** 
    (4.59) 
     
Constant 0.0178*** 0.0178*** 0.0412* 0.00666 
 (3.36) (3.36) (1.95) (0.38) 
     
Observations 31 31 31 31 
Adjusted R-squared 0.155 0.155 0.140 0.507 
     
t statistics in parentheses    



















Table 12: Severance pay and manufacturing employment intensive growth ˆmanufacturinge  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 full sample No outliers Controls Growth 
Severance payment 0.000354*** 0.00144 -0.00491 -0.0151*** 
 (2.93) (0.31) (-0.55) (-3.39) 
     
gini_t0   0.000150 0.000427 
   (0.24) (1.44) 
     
h_t0   0.000609 0.00215***
   (0.89) (5.49) 
     
Changes in GDP per capita    0.252*** 
    (6.86) 
     
Constant -0.00307 -0.00659 -0.000497 -0.00640 
 (-0.79) (-0.42) (-0.02) (-0.46) 
     
Observations 19 17 17 17 
Adjusted R-squared 0.297 -0.060 -0.144 0.748 
     
t statistics in parentheses     
="* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01"   
 
Table 13: Absolute minimum wage and secondary sector employment intensive growth 
sec _ secˆ ondary tore  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 full sample No outliers Controls Growth 
minimum wage -0.000295*** -0.000295*** -0.000284** -0.000144 
 (-2.95) (-2.95) (-2.65) (-1.36) 
     
gini_t0   -0.000722 -0.000320 
   (-1.17) (-0.56) 
     
h_t0   -0.00114* -0.000827 
   (-1.96) (-1.56) 
     
Changes in GDP per 
capita    0.214*** 
    (3.16) 
     
Constant 0.0310*** 0.0310*** 0.0761** 0.0283 
 (2.90) (2.90) (2.50) (0.90) 
     
Observations 42 42 42 42 
Adjusted R-squared 0.158 0.158 0.213 0.364 
     
t statistics in parentheses    
="* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01"   
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Table 14: Paid annual leave and secondary sector employment intensive growth sec _ secˆ ondary tore  





outliers Controls Growth 
paid annual leave 0.000586 0.000193 0.00335 0.00336* 
 (0.18) (0.13) (1.62) (1.89) 
     





   (-2.17) (-2.31) 
     
h_t0   -0.00212 -0.00181 
   (-1.06) (-1.05) 
     
Changes in GDP per 
capita    0.240* 
    (2.20) 
     
Constant 0.00175 -0.0109 0.117* 0.0893 
 (0.03) (-0.40) (1.81) (1.56) 
     
Observations 16 15 15 15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.069 -0.076 0.115 0.344 
     
t statistics in parentheses   



























Table 15: Share of workers in agriculture and manufacturing employment intensive growth 
ˆmanufacturinge  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
full 
sample No outliers Controls Growth 
Share of workers in 
agriculture 0.0224 0.0292* 0.0531*** 0.0408** 
 (0.97) (1.75) (2.70) (2.19) 
     
Initial level of Gini coeff.   0.000371* 0.000501** 
   (1.78) (2.52) 
     
Initial level of poverty   
-
0.000287* -0.000160 
   (-1.74) (-1.01) 
     
Changes in GDP per capita    0.0952*** 
    (3.85) 
     
Constant -0.00438 -0.00585* -0.0244** -0.0334*** 
 (-0.97) (-1.80) (-2.13) (-3.04) 
     
Observations 109 105 105 105 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001 0.020 0.048 0.163 
     
t statistics in parentheses     






















Table 16: Share of workers in agriculture and secondary sector employment intensive growth 
sec _ secˆ ondary tore  





outliers Controls Growth 
     
Share of workers in 
agriculture 0.0609 0.0933*** 0.112*** 0.0882*** 
 (1.45) (3.38) (3.38) (2.87) 
     
Initial level of Gini coeff.   0.000253 0.000506 
   (0.72) (1.55) 
     





   (-0.99) (-0.11) 
     
Changes in GDP per capita    0.186*** 
    (4.58) 
     
Constant -0.0105 
-
0.0178*** -0.0301 -0.0476*** 
 (-1.28) (-3.30) (-1.55) (-2.63) 
     
Observations 109 105 105 105 
Adjusted R-squared 0.010 0.091 0.085 0.236 
     
t statistics in parentheses     
="* p<.10  ** p<.05 
 *** 
p<.01"     
 
